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NOTES
At Last, Federal Wage and Overtime Protection
For State and Municipal Empoyees: The F.L.S.A.
After Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority
Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to
maintain the minimum standard of living necessary for the health,
efficiency and general well being of workers.1 To achieve this goal,
the Act requires employers involved in commerce to pay a mini-
mum hourly wage2 and overtime for all hours over forty hours per
week.3 The Act initially exempted all governmental workers.4
However, Congress has slowly eroded that exemption as applied to
the states and their political subdivisions5 by using the power dele-
gated to it under the Commerce Clause of the United States Con-
stitution.6 The erosion of that exemption has caused some trouble-
some issues for the United States Supreme Court and state and
local legislatures.
In 1976, the United States Supreme Court ruled in National
League of Cities v. Useryl that the tenth amendment of the
United States Constitution" renders immune from the Act states'
"integral operations" which are within "traditional governmental
functions." National League thus placed a limit on congressional
commerce power and enabled the states to create their own labor
1. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1940), amended by 29
U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (Supp. 11 1964) and 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219. (Supp. IV. 1970) (current
version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)) [hereinafter cited as "the Act"
or FLSA].
2. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (1940).
3. Id. at § 207(a)(3).
4. Id. at § 203(d). The Act defined an employer so as to exclude "the United States
or any State or political subdivision of a State..."
5. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (Supp. 11 1964); 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (Supp. IV 1970). Both of
these statutes are broad amendments to the FLSA which extended coverage to numerous
classes of state and municipal employees.
6. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. "The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.
7. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
8. U.S. CONsT. amend. X: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people."
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standards within certain protected areas. 9
The courts struggled with National League10 for nine years un-
til it was overruled recently in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropoli-
tan Transit Authority."' In Garcia, the United States Supreme
Court attempted to eradicate numerous ambiguities created by
National League.'2 In doing so, the Court created a new standard
of congressional limitation that extends FLSA protection to nu-
merous classes of state and municipal employees.
The impact of Garcia on both the public sector'3 and this coun-
try's traditional concepts of federalism,' 4 will be enormous. Addi-
tionally, Garcia has created many new questions concerning the
applicability of the FLSA to public employees.
This Note focuses on the effects Garcia will have upon the
FLSA and the FLSA's application to state and municipal employ-
ees. To accomplish this, this Note first will examine the history of
the FLSA and its tenuous application to state and municipal
workers. 15 This Note then will analyze Garcia itself, exploring
both the analysis of the Supreme Court16 and some possible
ramifications of the decision.' 7 Lastly, this Note will examine the
emerging new standard of commerce clause application and the
political impact that Garcia will have on the FLSA and the
states.' 8
I. HISTORY OF THE FLSA APPLICATION TO THE STATES
Assessing the impact of the Garcia ruling on state and munici-
pal employees requires an examination of both the history of the
FLSA and the Act's delicate application to the states. Such a
study reveals that Congress and the Supreme Court extended the
protection of the FLSA beyond its originally contemplated benefi-
ciaries. This activism, conducted under the auspices of the com-
9. Under the holding, the states and their political subdivisions could claim immunity
from FLSA coverage with regard to functions which were essential attributes of state sov-
ereignty. More specifically, employees within the police, firefighting, education and many
other public fields were held immune from FLSA protection. See infra note 46 and accom-
panying text.
10. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
11. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
12. See Infra Part IV.
13. See 23 GOV'T EMPL REL REP. (BNA) 1432-35 (1985) [hereinafter cited as
BNA], for a detailed discussion of some congressional amendments proposed in the wake of
the Garcia decision.
14. See Comment, The Changing Landscape of Federalism, 28 WASH. J. URB. CONT.
L. 445 (1985).
15. See infra notes 19-74 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 75-93 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 94-118 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 119-51 and accompanying text.
(Vol. 23
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merce clause, significantly eroded states' control over their
workers.
Initially, Congress intended the FLSA to apply solely to private
employees engaged in interstate commerce.1  Construed narrowly,
the Act was a valid exercise of congressional commerce power.20
Under that narrow construction, the Act enabled Congress only to
regulate those commercial activities involving more than one state.
Under the tenth amendment, the states, not the federal govern-
ment, legislated as to all other activities.21
This concept was eroded by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Darby.22 There, the Court extended FLSA protection to
purely intrastate activities as long as such activities affected inter-
state commerce.23 Holding that the tenth amendment contains no
limitation on federal power to regulate interstate commerce,24 the
Darby Court emphasized that the Act was a necessary and appro-
priate means to attain legitimate congressional ends. 5 Justice
Stone, writing for the majority, concluded that interstate com-
merce should not be used as an "instrument of competition" in the
distribution of goods produced under substandard labor
conditions.26
After Darby, courts broadly interpreted the provisions of the
FLSA so as to further the Act's "legitimate ends." 27 Courts'
broad interpretations resulted in the extension of FLSA protection
to nearly all private employees engaged in the "production" of
goods for commerce.28 In 1961, Congress took a step to update the
Act's provisions to keep it in line with these broader judicial inter-
pretations.2 9 In 1966, Congress removed the long held exemption
favoring states and their political subdivisions by expanding cover-
19. 29 U.S.C. § 215(A)(1) (1940).
20. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), which established the right
of Congress to regulate commerce amongst the states. Gibbons, which was primary author-
ity for Congress in 1938 to enact legislation protecting workers engaged in interstate com-
merce, defined such commerce as those activities which directly affect more than one state.
21. See supra note 8.
22. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
23. Id. at 118.
24. Id. at 124, where the Court notes that the tenth amendment is but a truism.
25. Id. at 118.
26. Id. at 110.
27. See, e.g., W. Union Tel. Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490 (1945).
28. See Annotation, 161 A.L.R. 1237 (1945). This annotation provides an excellent
discussion on the Court's liberal expansion of the term "Production of goods for Com-
merce" as used in the Fair Labor Standards Act, so as to include all steps of production,
whether manufacturing or not, and every kind of operation incidental thereto.
29. 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(r), 203(s), 206(b), 207(a)(2) (Supp. 11 1964). These amend-
ments extended coverage not only to those employees involved in the "production" of goods
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age to include state and local employees working in education,
public mass transit and health care.30
The constitutionality of these amendments was upheld in Mary-
land v. Wirtz.3a In Wirtz, the Court extended FLSA coverage to
all private employees who were part of an enterprise engaged in
interstate commerce. Stating that the competitive position of an
enterprise is affected by all of its labor costs and not solely those
costs involved with the interstate activity, the Court upheld the
1961 Amendment. 2 The Wirtz Court also found the 1966 FLSA
Amendment constitutional, thereby extending FLSA coverage to
state and municipal employees for the first time.33 The Court
noted the "substantial impact" that these public employees have
on interstate commerce because their institutions are supplied
with goods obtained through interstate commerce. 34 The Court
reasoned that such an impact justified federal protection of state
and municipal employees. 5
Using the Wirtz decision as a judicial mandate, in 1974 Con-
gress broadened FLSA coverage to include public agencies.3 6 This
amendment virtually abolished any exemption Congress previously
had afforded to states and their political subdivisions. FLSA pro-
tection was thus extended to practically all government employ-
ees.3 7 Fearing bankruptcy, numerous states and municipalities ac-
ted swiftly by questioning the amendment's constitutionality in
National Leage of Cities v. Usery.38
In National League, the Court held the broad 1974 FLSA
amendment unconstitutional and barred its application to many
30. Id. at § 203 (d).
31. 392 U.S. 183 (1968). In Wirtz, numerous states and cities petitioned the Court
to enjoin the Department of Labor from enforcing the 1961 and 1966 FLSA Amendments.
These governments contended that the tenth amendment should bar such enforcerment.
32. Id. at 190.
33. Id. at 192.
34. Id. at 194. The Court explained that in 1965, 87% of the $8 million spent to
supply Maryland's public schools came directly from interstate purchases.
35. Id. at 194.
36. The term "public agency" was defined as including "the government of the
United States; the government of a State or political subdivision thereof; any agency of the
United States (including the United States Postal Service and Postal Rate Commission), a
State, or a political subdivision of a State; or any interstate governmental agency." 29
U.S.C. § 203(x) (Supp. IV 1970).
37. The only government employees still held exempt from the Act are executive,
administrative or professional personnel, Id. at § 213(a)(1), and individuals holding public
office or serving such an office holder in one of several specific capacities. Id. at §
203(e)(2)(c).
38. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). The plaintiff states and cities claimed that the 1974
amendments were prohibited by the tenth amendment because they regulated the states as
states. The plaintiffs were seeking an injunction from the Court barring the Department of
Labor from enforcing the amendments.
[Vol. 23
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classes of state and municipal employees. 9 In a sharply divided
plurality decision, the Court emphasized a state's tenth amend-
ment right to remain sovereign.4 ° Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the plurality, stressed that Congress could not use its commerce
power to restructure "integral operations" in protected areas of
"traditional governmental functions.' According to Justice
Rehnquist, such powers are reserved to the states.4 2 The court
noted, however, that the tenth amendment is not absolute; rather,
under the commerce clause Congress may invade these "tradi-
tional areas" if an overriding federal interest exists.43
An element essential to the plurality's rationale in National
League was the adverse effect that observance of FLSA regula-
tions would have had on state and municipal budgets." The Court
feared that state and local compliance would be "financially bur-
densome," ultimately forcing governments either to increase reve-
nues or to cut back essential services. 45 The plurality reasoned
that the 1974 amendment was such an onerous intrusion on state
power that it would have prohibited the states from structuring
various functions which are "essential attributes of state
sovereignty. 48
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun expressed
the need for the Court to rely upon a balancing approach which
would consider the relative federal and state interests. This con-
currence created a dichotomy in the holding which later confused
courts and diminshed the effectiveness of the National League
holding.47
In National League, the Court attempted to stem the historic
tide of judicial approval that favored congressional regulation of
state and municipal employees. However, the National League ra-
tionale had many shortcomings that later plagued courts attempt-
ing to apply its holding.
39. Id. at 851.
40. Id. at 844.
41. Id. at 851. The Court noted that the structuring of employer-employee relation-
ships typically was the function of state and local governments.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 853. The Court's decision is in line with the holding of Fry v. United
States, 421 U.S. 542, 543 (1975). The Court in Fry upheld the constitutionality of the
Economic Stabilization Act which imposed a temporary wage freeze on state and local
governments. The Court noted that congressional commerce power is not so inflexible as to
preclude emergency and temporary measures.
44. National League, 426 U.S. at 846.
45. Id. at 847. The Court mentioned as an example the curtailment of an Affirmative
Action Program in Inglewood, California.
46. Id. at 851.
47. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan argued that the plurality ignored the
supremacy of federal power and broke a long line of judicial precedent. Id. at 856-80.
1986]
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II. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED WITH NATIONAL LEAGUE
Although National League placed limits on congressional power
in the context of the FLSA, it did not adequately identify those
situations in which such limitations should apply.48 Subsequently,
lower courts had difficulty determining which state and local func-
tions were protected by the Act. 9
Responding to these ambiguities, the Supreme Court restruc-
tured the National League criteria in Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining and Reclamation Association.5" In Hodel, a "three-prong
plus balancing" test was created by incorporating the elements
enunciated in the National League holding. Under this test, states
were protected from Commerce Clause legislation if the chal-
lenged legislation (1) regulated the states as states, (2) infringed
upon areas that were unquestionably attributes of state sover-
eignty, and (3) directly interfered with states' freedom to struc-
ture "integral operations" in areas of "traditional functions. ' 51
The Court's attempt in Hodel to clear up the many unanswered
questions left in the wake of National League ultimately failed.
Lower courts continued to apply the test inconsistently. 2 Part of
the reason for the test's inconsistent application was the Supreme
Court's failure to adequately define the scope of the state and lo-
cal governmental functions deemed protected under the National
League test.53
The Court's final attempt at applying the National League-Ho-
del ruling was in EEOC v. Wyoming." There, the Court upheld
the application of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) against the State of Wyoming. 55 The Court stated that
48. For a thorough discussion of the problems inherent in the National League hold-
ing, see, e.g., Note, The Constitutionality of ADEA After Usery, 30 ARK. L. REv. 363,
366-68 (1977). That Note stresses that the Court's decision created a conflict between the
direct interference test of the plurality and the balancing test of the concurrence.
49. Compare United States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 1978), which
held that the licensing of automobile drivers was a traditional function of state government
not protected by the Act, with Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25, 38 (2d Cir.
1977), which held that the regulation of traffic was not a traditional function of state gov-
ernments and extended protection to the employee therein.
50. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
51. Id. at 287-88. The Hodel decision apparently preserved the rule of Fry v. United
States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975), that the states must submit to congressional commerce power
in times of national emergencies. See supra note 43.
52. Compare Bonnette v. California Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465,
1472 (9th Cir. 1983), upholding the application of FLSA provisions to state in-house do-
mestic services employees, with Williams v. Eastside Mental Health Center, Inc., 669 F.2d
671, 680-81 (4th Cir. 1982), holding a state run mental health facility immune from FLSA
provisions.
53. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 541 (1985).
54. 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
55. Id. at 238-39. The rules of application of the ADEA are the same as those
[Vol. 23
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the federal legislation did not impair Wyoming's ability to struc-
ture "integral operations" within "traditional areas" of state sov-
ereignty.56 The Court stressed the Act's limited intrusion and
thereby carefully distinguished National League of Cities.5 7 Es-
sential to the Court's reasoning was the presence of the Bona Fide
Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) 58 and the individual assess-
ments within the ADEA itself.5 The "burdensome financial im-
pact" greatly feared in National League was dismissed in
EEOC.60
The nine year life of the National League holding was plagued
by ambiguity and inconsistency. Attempts at refining its principles
in cases such as Hodel and EEOC failed, prompting the majority
in Garcia to label the National League doctrine "unsound in prin-
ciple" and "unworkable in practice. 61
III. HISTORY OF GARCIA
Three years after the Court's decision in National League, the
Department of Labor issued an opinion stating that the San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (SAMTA) was not con-
stitutionally immune from FLSA provisions.62 Soon thereafter,
SAMTA sought declaratory relief in district court,6 3 asserting
that it was exempt from the FLSA since it was a state mass
transit authority.64 The United States Secretary of Labor counter-
claimed, seeking enforcement of the FLSA overtime and record-
keeping requirements.6 5 Garcia, a SAMTA employee, was allowed
to intervene as a defendant in support of the Secretary.66
The district court granted SAMTA's motion for summary judg-
adopted by Congress for the FLSA. Under both of these rules, the same definition of "em-
ployer" is used. See 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1982).
56. EEOC, 460 U.S. at 239.
57. Id. at 239-42.
58. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (f)(1) (Supp. III 1985). This statute provides an exception to the
ADEA provisions when age is an occupational qualification necessary for the normal opera-
tion of a job.
59. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(3) (1982). This section provides that discharges or other ac-
tions for good cause are allowed by Congress and do not violate the ADEA provisions. The
Court stated that the presence of these exceptions to the federal legislation lessened the
impact of the ADEA on the states and their political subdivisions. EEOC, 460 U.S. at 239-
42.
60. EEOC, 460 U.S. at 242-43 n.17. The Court noted that the "minimal character
of the federal intrusion," when measured against the "well-defined federal interest in the
legislation," justified state compliance with the FLSA.
61. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546. Garcia was a 5-4 decision.
62. Opinion WH-499, 6 LRR 91:1138 (1979), cited in Garcia, 469 U.S. at 534.
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ment.67 Both the Secretary and Garcia appealed directly to the
Supreme Court.0 8 The Supreme Court issued an order which va-
cated and remanded the case to the district court69 in light of its
ruling in United Transportation Union v. Long Island Railroad."0
In Long Island, the Court held that a state-owned public com-
muter rail service was not immune from federal legislation be-
cause it did not constitute a "traditional governmental function." '71
On remand, the district court in Garcia distinguished Long Is-
land and held that SAMTA was immune from FLSA coverage. 2
The court cited the long historical involvement of state and local
governments in public transit as rationale for its conclusion that
mass transit systems are "traditional functions" of these govern-
ments.73 The district court also emphasized that the federal inter-
est in transit wages was relatively new, stating that Congress first
displayed an interest in transit workers in 1966.74 The district
court's decision was again appealed to the Supreme Court where
the tenth amendment principles set forth in National League were
reconsidered.
IV. THE GARCIA HOLDING
The Court initially addressed the issue of whether operation of
a public mass transit system was a "traditional function" warrant-
ing tenth amendment immunity. After carefully examining Na-
tional League and Hodel, the Court criticized those cases as
troublesome and elusive. Citing confusion and inconsistency
among the lower courts,75 the Court recognized that it had made
little progress in defining the scope of immunity granted to states
by National League."6
The Court discredited the purely historical approach applied by
the district court as "prevent[ing] a court from accomodating
67. Id. The district court granted summary judgment, holding that public mass
transit systems constitute integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions.
This decision was not published by the district court.
68. Id. 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1982) allows for direct appeal to the Supreme Court.
69. 457 U.S. 1102 (1982).
70. 455 U.S. 678 (1982).
71. Id. at 684.
72. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth. v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp. 445
(W.D.Tex. 1983), aff'd sub. nom. Garcia, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
73. Donovan, 557 F. Supp. at 447-48.
74. Id.
75. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 538-39.
76. Id. More specifically, Justice Blackmun listed a number of lower court decisions
in which state governmental "functions" warranting immunity under the National League
doctrine were determined. He then contrasted these decisions with ones in which protection
was not extended. In conclusion, he stated that it was virtually impossible to identify an
organizing principle that determines which functions are protected and which are not.
[Vol. 23
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changes in the historical functions of states."' The Court went on
to disregard numerous other approaches as "unworkable" before
concluding that any attempt to define immunity by applying the
National League prerequisites "inevitably invites an unelected ju-
diciary to make decisions about which state policies it likes and
which ones it dislikes."178 Using this criticism as its rationale, the
Court overruled National League and formulated a new approach
for determining state immunity from the FLSA.79
V. A NEw APPROACH
The Court turned to the Constitution and examined the federal
system's true nature in order to decide whether Congress had ac-
ted properly in extending FLSA protection to the states.8 0 Inter-
preting the Constitution, the Court recognized that states "un-
questionably retain a significant measure of sovereign
authority." ' However, this state authority is limited "only to the
extent that the Constitution has not divested [the states] of their
original powers and transferred those powers to the federal
government."82
The Court found an absence of specific constitutional limita-
tions on federal authority. 3 Using this premise, the Court held
that the founding fathers chose to rely on a federal system to limit
federal powers and protect states' interests.8 4 The Court noted
that "[s]tate sovereign interests ... are more properly protected
by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal
system than by judicially created limitations on federal powers."8 5
The Court stated that the federal system provides a political
process which serves as a restraint on federal power and thus pro-
77. Id. at 534-44.
78. Id. at 540-46. Among the other approaches examined were: (1) A "basic state
prerogatives" approach under which immunity would be extended if the federal statute
unduly handicapped a basic state prerogative. The problem with this approach was deter-
mining what constituted a basic state prerogative. In doing so, many of the problems en-
countered with the National League test would arise. (2) Distinguishing which functions
were "strictly governmental" from those which were proprietary. Under this theory, if the
function was that which was performed solely by government and not private individuals,
the immdnity would be extended. This test was abandoned for essentially the same reason
as stated above. (3) A purely non-historical approach was also examined and disregarded
by the Court.
79. See infra text accompanying notes 119-31, wherein the Court's new standard is
fully examined.
80. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 549-54.
81. Id. at 549 (citing EEOC, 460 U.S. at 269).
82. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 549.
83. Id. at 549-52. The Court stated that with few exceptions, the Constitution fails
to express what elements of state sovereignty federal powers shall not displace.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 552.
19861
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tects state sovereignty.86 The Constitution confers on states,
through their citizens, the right to select both the executive and
the legislative branches of the federal government. Through the
national political structure, states can protect their sovereignty by
influencing their elected federal representatives.87
The majority noted further that the federal system's effective-
ness in preserving state interests is "apparent even today in the
course of federal legislation."881 The Court then noted major ex-
amples of congressional legislation which benefited states finan-
cially, while at the same time expressly exempted them from fed-
eral regulations. 89
Applying its new outlook to the facts in Garcia, the Court ex-
amined the 1966 and 1974 FLSA amendments extending protec-
tion respectively to mass transit and state employees in general.90
The Court noted that during those eight years, congress provided
extensive funding for state and local transit systems through the
United Mass Transportation Act.91 The Court noted further that
the field of mass transit had been one in which the federal system
benefited the states while at the same time protected states'
interests.92
In conclusion, the Court held that Congress' action in affording
FLSA protection to SAMTA employees did not contravene any
limit on congressional power under the commerce clause. The
Court, however, did not speculate as to the effect Garcia would
have on state interests in other commerce clause legislation.9"
86. Id. at 550-51.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 552.
89. Id. at 553. The Court mentioned that "the Federal Power Act [16 U.S.C. §
824(0 (1982)], the National Labor Relations Act [29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1982)], the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act [29 U.S.C. § 402(e) (1982)], the Occupational
Safety and Health Act [29 U.S.C. § 652(5) (1982)], the Employee Retirement Insurance
Security Act [29 U.S.C. §§ 1003(b)(l), 1002(32) (1982)] and the Sherman Act [see
Parker vs. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943)] all contain express or implied exemptions for
states and their subdivisions."
90. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 555.
91. Id. The Court mentioned that in two decades the U.M.T.A., 49 US.C. app. §
1601-1618 (1982), amended by 49 U.S.C. app. § 1601-1618 (Supp. 1 1983), and 49 U.S.C.
app. § 1601-1618 (Supp. 111984), had provided over $22 billion in mass transit aid to state
and local governments, contributing over $3.7 billion in 1983 alone.
92. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 555. The Court stated that the "individual mass transit sys-
tems [are] better off than they would have been had Congress never intervened at all in the
area."
93. Justice Powell, in a forceful dissent, claimed that the majority opinion substan-
tially alters the federal system embodied in the Constitution. He charged that the "decision
effectively reduces the Tenth Amendment to meaningless rhetoric when Congress acts pur-
suant to the Commerce Clause." Id. at 560. Justice Powell stressed further that the major-
ity opinion would have an adverse effect on the Court and the importance of judicial re-
view. He went on to defend the balancing approach mentioned in National League as "a
[Vol. 23
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VI. PROBLEMS WITH GARCIA
Garcia has an enormous impact upon the FLSA and all levels
of government. The courts are no longer the sole arbiters of dis-
putes arising from FLSA protection of public employees.94 Now,
the federal government determines when the FLSA is extended
and what classes of public employees are covered.9 5 This central-
izes a greater amount of control in the federal government and
correspondingly limits the states' power to regulate their employ-
ees.96 As a result, protection of state interests and regulation of
state employees must be accomplished through the national politi-
cal process; that is, by influencing representatives in the federal
government.9 This result has some shortcomings.
A major problem that confronts Congress is its inability to ad-
dress the individual needs present within each state and municipal
labor system. A highly diverse national economy, as exists in the
United States, necessarily creates unique attributes in each state
and municipality.98 This diversity often creates competing eco-
functional doctrine ... whose ultimate purpose is not to create a sacred province of state
autonomy, but to ensure that the unique benefits of a federal system not be lost through
undue federal interference in certain core state functions." Id. at 526-68 (citing EEOC,
460 U.S. at 236). Justice Powell concluded that the majority's sweeping holding does far
more than answer the sole question it was presented and enables the national government
to "'devour the essentials of state sovereignty, though that sovereignty is attested by the
Tenth Amendment.'" Garcia, 469 U.S. at 579 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183,
205 (1968)).
Justice O'Connor, dissenting separately, assailed the majority's retreat from established
principles of federalism. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580. She found no basis for the expansion of
federal power with respect to states, and stated that the abandonment of National League
has left nothing between the remaining essentials of state sovereignty and Congress except
Congress' "underdeveloped capacity for self-restraint." Id. at 587-88. Justice O'Connor
concluded that "[t]he problems of federalism in an integrated national economy are capa-
ble of a more responsible resolution than holding that the States as States retain no status
apart from that which Congress chooses to let them retain." Id.
Justice Rehnquist also disented. He stated that he was confident the National League of
Cities rule would "in time again command the support of a majority of this Court." Id. at
579-80.
94. Id. at 552-56. FLSA application to the states is an issue for the federal govern-
ment to determine rather than an "unelected judiciary."
95. Id.
96. The Garcia decision focuses all attention upon the federal government in deter-
mining FLSA application. In essence, this limits the ability of the states and their subdivi-
sions to regulate their employees.
97. Id. The Garcia Court claims that state sovereignty is better protected through
the federal political process than by judicial definitions of state sovereignty given pursuant
to the tenth amendment. This holding is in line with Justice Stevens' dissent in National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 880 (1976).
98. Obviously not all state and municipal governments possess the same attributes.
Many governments, mainly those in the Sun Belt region, are better off financially than
those in less affluent areas. These governments are therefore better able to meet the in-
creased labor costs caused by full FLSA compliance. Other less fortunate governments will
be forced to cut needed services or raise taxes to increase revenues. Both options are not
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nomic interests among the states and municipalities. Nevertheless,
Garcia demands that these competing economic interests as they
relate to employment be resolved solely within the federal govern-
ment.91 As a result, many local labor interests are compromised to
the larger national concerns as determined not by the states which
are familiar with their particular needs, but rather by the federal
government.100
Another major problem with Garcia is the great reliance the
Court places on the national political process." This process, as it
currently stands, may not be the best vehicle to balance the exer-
cise of federal power with the preservation of states' rights.10 2 The
enormous increase of national legislation in the past thirty years,
combined with
[t]he adoption of the seventeenth amendment (providing for di-
rect election of senators), the weakening of political parties on
the local level, and the rise of national media, among other
things, have made Congress increasingly less representative of
State and local interests, and instead, more likely to be respon-
sive to the demands of various national constituencies.10°
The emergence of powerful lobbyists for both labor and govern-
ments helps illustrate this shift in congressional interest. This fed-
eral turnabout presently makes the national political process more
likely to forsake local interests to the greater national concerns.10 4
Lastly, the Garcia decision failed to define the role of the judici-
ary in determining the limits of congressional action.10 5 This fail-
ure will have a negative impact upon future FLSA application
and implementation. The Garcia holding has left the courts in a
state of uncertainty. This is a result of the Garcia Court's failure
very favorable.
99. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550-56.
100. This point was stated by Justice Rehnquist in National League of Cities, 426
U.S. at 848.
101. The effectiveness of the national political process to preserve states' rights was
bitterly disputed by Justice Powell in his dissent. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 564-67. Justice Pow-
ell stated that "[m]embers of Congress are elected from the various States, but once in
office they are members of the federal government." Id. at 564-65.
102. Id. at 564-67.
103. Id. at n.9. For more information, see ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERN-
MENTAL RELATIONS, REGULATING FEDERALISM: POLICY, PROCESS, IMPACT AND REFORM 50
(1984). See also Kaden, Politics, Money and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 847 (1979). Professor Kaden proposes the theory that due to many politi-
cal changes nationally, the political branches may no longer be able to safeguard state
sovereignty within the federal system.
104. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 564-67.
105. Id. at 550-56. The Court merely stated that state sovereign interests are better
protected through the federal government and the national political process. The Court
makes no mention of the role the courts will have in defining the limits of Congressional
action if the national political process fails to function effectively. Id. at 554-56.
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to articulate specific limits upon congressional action. 1°0 This am-
biguity will make it difficult for the Court to act decisively if the
political process fails and limits upon the exercise of federal power
need to be imposed. Thus, Garcia has left many questions con-
cerning the effective functioning of our diverse federal system un-
answered. Not withstanding its shortcomings, Garcia also has nu-
merous positive aspects that will contribute to effective
administration of uniform labor regulations.
VII. POSITIVE IMPACT OF GARCIA
The Garcia ruling's positive elements greatly aid state and local
employees. State and local governments no longer can claim un-
conditional immunity from federal labor standards which have
protected private employees for almost fifty years. Minimum wage
and overtime requirements finally will be extended to millions of
previously exempted public employees. Labor standards through-
out the country will become more uniform, making them easier to
enforce. Garcia also places more reliance on democratic princi-
ples, thereby limiting the ability of an unelected judiciary to usurp
the public's popular demands.
The Garcia decision ultimately benefits numerous classes of
state and municipal employees.107 State immunity, which has ex-
isted throughout the life of the FLSA, virtually is eliminated. Ap-
proximately sixty-five percent of all state and municipal workers
should benefit from the decision.108 Those benefiting the most are
police, fire fighters and seasonal employees. 109
Another of the positive elements of Garcia is that it will make
labor standards throughout the country more uniform and easier
to enforce. The courts and the Department of Labor no longer
need to concern themselves with the confusing National League
test which was determined "unsound in principle" and "unwork-
able in practice."110 The conflicting labor standards which were
106. Id.
107. The number of state and municipal entities the Garcia holding aids is not easily
ascertainable. With the National League holding and the exemption of many public em-
ployees from FLSA protection, union contracts were negotiated to give coverage equal to
that provided under the FLSA. Currently, thirty-five percent of state and municipal work-
ers are covered under these still existing contracts. BNA, supra note 13, at 1434.
108. Id. This figure is derived from taking the difference between those employees
covered under union contracts and those who are not. This figure does not include those
public employees who are expressly exempted from the Act. See supra note 37.
109. 29 U.S.C. § 207(o)(3)(A) (Supp. III 1985) which allows such workers to accu-
mulate twice as much compensatory time as other employees. See infra notes 144-48 and
accompanying text.
110. This point is based upon the presumption that by eliminating the "unsound and
unworkable" National League doctrine, the courts and the Department of Labor will no
1986]
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once the domain of numerous state and municipal governments
now are regulated by one governmental entity."" This will assist
aggrieved public employees in asserting claims against their gov-
ernmental employers." 2 This centralized regulation also will keep
administrative costs down at all levels of government 13 and ulti-
mately decrease the soaring court costs associated with National
League."
4
Finally, since control of FLSA application now rests not with
an "unelected judiciary" but rather with the federal government,
popular public demands will be heard.115 Both individual voters
and large national lobbyists can have their views expressed
through the political process. 16 Congress should incorporate these
views into employment law that are uniform and representative of
workers' needs and desires.1 1 7 Congress is more inclined to deal
with the numerous problems surrounding FLSA application to
states and municipalities than are the courts. 8
Garcia thus contains many positive elements that will aid in the
effective and uniform regulation of state and municipal employees.
However, the most far-reaching effect the decision will have is the
establishment of a new standard of FLSA application.
longer be bothered with its troublesome application. See supra note 61 and accompanying
text. Labor standards will be set by the federal government and their application to the
states most likely will not be scrutinized.
11. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550-56. The regulation of labor standards will now be done
solely by the federal government. Still, for a municipal field to become subject to the
FLSA, there must be an expressed or implied federal interest in the area to displace the
state sovereign right. Id. See also infra text accompanying notes 119-31.
112. Each public employee who was previously exempted from FLSA protection was
either protected by a union contract or some other state or local labor regulation. The
result was an array of varying regulations that employment attorneys were forced to sift
through. Garcia will make the labor standards for public employees more uniform nation-
ally, thereby reducing previous conflicts between authorities and consequent problems for
labor attorneys.
113. State and municipal governments no longer will need to expend costly resources
to structure and monitor their own labor standards. This function will be assumed by the
federal government. This will lower administrative costs for state and municipal govern-
ments and save them revenue.
114. The inconsistency and uncertainty brought on by the National League holding
ultimately forced many states and municipalities into court to determine whether the
FLSA applied to their activities. This litigation process was costly and should be greatly
reduced by the Garcia holding.
115. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552-56.
116. Id.
117. Id. The Court here was relying upon the federal legislative process to resolve
many of the questions created by commerce clause application to the states. The Court
listed some federal commerce clause legislation to support its point that the federal legisla-
tive process is better able to deal with this issue than the judiciary.
118. Garcia, 499 U.S. at 552-56.
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VIII. NEW STANDARD OF FLSA APPLICATION
The Court's decision in Garcia creates a new standard of in-
quiry for determining when FLSA provisions are applied to the
states and their political subdivisions. That determination no
longer is gauged by a judicially-manufactured definition of state
sovereignty. Now, the standard is based solely upon the actions of
the federal government.'19
Discerning the federal interest in the field of state and munici-
pal employees is important in deciding which state or municipal
employees are now protected. This interest appears to be lesser in
degree than the "overriding" federal interest mentioned in Na-
tional League."2  Still, for Congress to legitimately exercise its
power under the commerce clause, there must be some indication
that Congress, through its legislation, has indicated an interest in
a particular state activity.
In determining what constitutes a federal interest, an examina-
tion of both the express language and subsequent effect of con-
gressional legislation is imperative. Although implicit in the opin-
ion, a critical element of the Garcia rationale was the substantial
amount of federal revenues Congress had provided state treasur-
ies.' 2' The Court went on to explain that a major portion of
SAMTA's operating costs came directly from federal subsidies. 2
By focusing on federal expenditures, the Court was in essence pro-
viding a factor to be weighed in determining whether state com-
pliance with the FLSA is mandated.' 23 This federal assistance
reduces "the risk of having [states'] functions ... handicapped by
119. Id. at 550-56. The Court emphasized that state sovereign interests are better
protected by the federal government and its national political process.
120. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. In National League, the Court men-
tioned that an "emergency" federal interest could subordinate the tenth amendment and
compel state submission. Nowhere in the Garcia decision was there any indication that the
federal interest needs to be so pervasive.
121. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552. The Court mentioned that "[i]n the past quarter cen-
tury alone, federal grants to States and localities have grown from $7 billion to $96 billion"
and that "federal grants now account for about one-fifth of state ... expenditures."
122. Id. at 532-33.
123. See id. at 555. The Court, however, stated in a footnote that compliance by
SAMTA with FLSA provisions would have been required even absent the presence of
"countervailing financial benefits." Id. at n.21. Still, the Court did imply throughout the
decision that the presence of federal funding can be a factor in showing a pervasive federal
interest. Two appellate courts considering the same question under the National League-
Hodel standard came to the same conclusion. See Dove v. Chattanooga Area Regional
Transp. Auth., 701 F.2d 50 (6th Cir. 1983); and, Kramer v. New Castle Transit Auth.,
677 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1982) cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1146 (1983). These courts extended
FLSA protection to employees of municipal transit services using the presence of federal
financing as rationale for their holding these functions non-traditional. Although these
cases were decided before Garcia, the use of federal financial assistance in determining
state submission to FLSA regulations is not new to the courts.
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Commerce Clause regulation."124 The assistance also confers a
benefit upon the states and leaves their "[governmental programs]
better off than if Congress had never intervened in the field. ' 25
Another factor which can be used to determine whether a fed-
eral interest exists is the presence of other federal legislation
within a given state field. Although this approach was not ex-
pressly mentioned in the Garcia decision, the Court indirectly en-
dorsed it as a rationale.1 26 The presence of other federal regula-
tions in a state employment field can help display a federal
interest in the workers employed in that field. 27 More specifically,
state education, highway and environmental employees may be
deemed protected under the FLSA simply because they are em-
ployed in activities which are highly regulated by the federal
government. 23
In essence, the new standard prescribed by the Garcia Court is
a means of determining the degree of federal interest in a specific
field. The actual amount of federal interest needed to compel state
conformity was not fully explained in the decision.1 29 Still, the
holding implies that some federal interest must be shown in order
for the federal government to displace the state's sovereign inter-
est reserved under the tenth amendment.1 30 Whether this interest
must be expressed through some type of federal legislation or may
be implied through the presence of federal funding is not
known.131
124. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 555.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 551-54. See also supra note 89. The Court, by examining other com-
merce clause legislation, was in essence examining how the federal government had both
benefited the states and protected their individual sovereignty through such laws.
127. This approach is obviously subject to the various classes of employees who are
exempted from the Act's provisons. See supra note 37.
128. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 551-54.
129. The Court in Garcia merely held that the extension of the FLSA to SAMTA
employees did not contravene any limit upon federal commerce clause power. Id. at 555-
56. The Court did not make a broad holding that all state and local public mass transit
employees are covered by the Act.
130. The Court held that state sovereign powers exist if they are not displaced by a
contravening federal power. Id. at 550-52. Therefore, the presence of some federal interest
must be present to displace the state's sovereign right pursuant to the tenth amendment.
Absent any federal interest, the state's right to regulate is superior to that of the federal
government. Id. at 550-56.
131. The Court in Garcia indicated that the presence of an expressed federal interest
without associated funding was enough to extend protection to SAMTA employees. See id.
at 555 n.21. Whether the presence of federal financial assistance alone is sufficient to com-
pel state submission was not mentioned by the Court. Past Court decisions have held, how-
ever, that the presence of federal financing is irrelevant to constitutional determinations.
See Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1981). The course that
courts will choose with regard to the funding issue in future FLSA cases remains to be
seen.
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IX. IMPACT OF THE NEW STANDARD UPON FLSA
The impact that the new Garcia standard will have on FLSA
application to state and municipal employees is uncertain. By
eliminating the limits placed on the 1966 and 1974 FLSA amend-
ments,132 the Court may have made the states and their political
subdivisions fully amenable to the Act. The conspicuously ex-
pressed federal interest in these amendments was sufficient to dis-
place sovereign state rights even in the absence of any counter-
vailing financial assistance or other commerce clause legislation.'
Therefore, FLSA protection should be extended to virtually all
state and municipal employees.'34
Such a result surely will be at variance with the interests of
state and local legislatures and the Garcia decision itself. Cur-
rently, state and municipal interests claim that the cost of comply-
ing with FLSA regulations could run as high as three to four bil-
lion dollars annually. 3 5 The intention of the Garcia Court,
however, was not to place state and local governments in a finan-
cial predicament. 3 6 According to Garcia, the federal govern-
ment's role is to protect the states and preserve their sovereignty,
not to bankrupt them.13 7
This consequence of Garcia creates a serious problem in recon-
ciling the Garcia standard of FLSA application with the financial
132. These amendments extended FLSA protection to virtually all classes of state
and municipal employees. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
133. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 555 n.21. See also supra note 123. The Court's statement
here that FLSA compliance need not be associated with countervailing federal assistance is
somewhat misleading. The Court throughout its decision used the presence of federal fund-
ing as a means of showing an interest sufficient to displace SAMTA's sovereign rights
pursuant to the tenth amendment. Then, in a footnote, the Court disclaimed this approach,
stating that the presence of countervailing financial assistance need not be shown to compel
state submission to commerce clause legislation. The Garcia Court, by placing this dis-
claimer in the decision, has created some uncertainty. Whether the disclaimer will be lim-
ited to the facts presented the Court in Garcia or expanded to all FLSA and commerce
clause legislation remains uncertain.
134. In Garcia, the Court held that the presence of the 1966 and 1974 amendments
alone was sufficient to display a federal interest and to compel state submission. Whether
this holding is to be construed narrowly or broadly is not known. Because of the majority's
reliance upon the national political process, the holding arguably will be construed broadly
and will extend FLSA protection to virtually all public employees.
135. BNA, supra note 13, at 1434. The figures quoted are estimates made by inter-
est groups representing state and local governments. These figures contradict the estimates
of the two largest public employee unions, the American Federation of State, County and
Municipal Employees and the Service Employees International Union. Nevertheless, the
figures quoted are based on time and one-half cash overtime in excess of 40 hours a week.
136. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 459-56. The Court mentioned that state sovereign rights
are to be protected by the federal government. Indeed, the great financial burden that
FLSA compliance would put on states was the major rationale for the Court's decision in
National League. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
137. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 549-54.
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realities of many states and municipalities. With regard to the
FLSA, Congress has explicitly stated that it has an interest in
state and municipal employees.1 38 This interest apparently is
enough to compel state and municipal compliance absent the pres-
ence of any countervailing financial assistance.139 State and mu-
nicipal compliance without any federal financial assistance is des-
tined to become "financially burdensome" for these governments.
The end result undermines the Garcia Court's contention that
state sovereign interests are better protected by the federal
government.4 0
Garcia ultimately provides a solution to the dilemma it has cre-
ated within the FLSA: the national political process. However, the
effects of callously delegating what has traditionally been a judi-
cial function to the federal legislators remains to be seen.
X. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The Garcia decision has created a backlash of outcries from
state, county and municipal governments.14 ' Fearing the astro-
nomical costs of compliance with FLSA regulations,142 these gov-
ernments have been relentlessly pressuring Congress for relief.
Their efforts have resulted in a number of House and Senate pro-
posals.1 43 The most significant proposal 44 was just recently signed
into law by President Reagan.4 Its proponents are optimistic that
the law will answer some of the unresolved questions now facing
the FLSA and its application to the states.
In essence, the new law will amend the FLSA's provisions to
provide state and municipal governments the option of giving
compensatory time off in lieu of cash overtime. 46 The compensa-
tory time off will be given at a premium rate of time and one-
138. See supra notes 30 and 36 and accompanying text.
139. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 555 n.21. See also supra notes 131, 133 and 134 and ac-
companying text.
140. By placing states and their political subdivisions in financial peril, the federal
government is not protecting sovereign rights, it is abolishing them.
141. BNA, supra note 13, at 1434.
142. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
143. BNA, supra note 13, at 1432-33. This BNA cites a rash of recent congressional
proposals which have varied from amending FLSA provisions to exclude public employees
(Rep. Tom Loeffiler, R.-Tex.), to delaying enforcement of the Garcia decision to allow more
time to consider the issues (Rep. John E. Porter, R.-Ill.).
144. S. 1570, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). This was proposed by Senators Pete Wil-
son (R.-CA) and Don Nickles (R.-Okla.). The bill is nearly identical to H.R. 3530, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
145. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1985, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-216 (Supp. III
1985).
146. Id. at § 207(o)(1).
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half. 47 The amount of compensatory time an employee can accu-
mulate is subject to an annual limit of 240 hours. State and local
police, firefighters and emergency workers can accumulate up to
480 hours a year.148
The new legislation is aimed at relieving the financial burdens
that full FLSA compliance will have on state and municipal gov-
ernments by allowing a less onerous means of overtime compensa-
tion. Instead of paying cash, these governments can now compen-
sate their employees with time off. While this legislation does
make the Garcia decision more agreeable to the states and their
political subdivisions, it does not affect the major issue of applica-
tion discussed throughout this Note.14 9
Overall, this legislation can be considered a victory for both
public employees and their governmental employers. Those public
workers who were previously not paid for overtime can now re-
ceive either compensatory time or cash payments at a time and
one-half premium rate. Governments which were facing a great
financial burden with FLSA compliance now will be given greater
flexibility to meet the needs of both their citizens and their
employees.1 50
This amendment to the FLSA may also be considered a victory
for the Garcia decision. Here, state and municipal governments,
through the use of the national political process, were able to pro-
tect their sovereign interests. The federal government displayed its
ability to protect public employees without unduly burdening the
states and their political subdivisions. If this amendment proves to
be successful, state sovereign interests may well be better pro-
tected by the federal government.1 51
147. Id.
148. Id. at § 207(o)(3)(A).
149. The new legislation merely changes the provisions of the FLSA to lessen the
financial burdens full compliance with the Act will have on state and municipal govern-
ments. The legislation does not affect the central issue of FLSA application decided by the
Garcia Court and discussed throughout this Note.
150. In essence, the new law is a compromise between various labor unions and state
and local governments. The practice of granting compensatory time off in lieu of cash
overtime is not new. Many union contracts negotiated after National League allow such a
practice. By granting compensatory time, state and municipal governments are able to hire
more employees to fill the gaps left by those employees using their time off. This ultimately
enables governments to provide overtime compensation without spending too many re-
sources or cutting back on essential services.
151. This statement may be limited to federal legislation pursuant to the FLSA. The
ability of the courts to protect the sovereign interests of the states regarding other com-
merce clause legislation is beyond the scope of this Note.
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CONCLUSION
Only in time will the long-term effects that the Garcia decision
will have upon FLSA application to the states and their political
subdivisions be realized. By eliminating the tenth amendment lim-
its imposed by the Court in National League, the Garcia decision
may have solved the confusing constitutional question of FLSA
application to state and municipal employees. Still, in resolving
that issue, the Court has created some new questions concerning
the political functioning of our diverse federal system.
The Garcia Court stated that the federal government, with its
national political process, was better able to protect individual
state and local needs. In its decision, however, the Court failed to
assess the ability of the federal government to adequately protect
the unique and individual labor needs presently existing through-
out the country. The Garcia majority also failed to consider the
impact that large national constituencies have upon the political
process.
The Garcia decision has extended FLSA protection to millions
of public employees who previously were exempted. This certainly
will make labor standards throughout the country more uniform
and more easily enforced. However, the financial burden this ex-
tension will have upon the states will be great, even with the re-
cent mitigating federal legislation. As yet, it is too early to deter-
mine if more restrictive federal legislation will be necessary in the
future.
Ultimately, the success of the Garcia decision will depend upon
the ability of the federal government to adequately protect state
and municipal sovereign rights. No longer can states and their po-
litical subdivisions rely upon their powers of limitation previously
granted under the tenth amendment. The burden now has been
shifted from the courts to the federal government to protect state
and municipal interests. If the federal government fails to carry
its burden, states and municipalities no doubt will once again peti-
tion the courts for a new interpretation of the tenth amendment.
John G. Kiwan*
* The author wishes to thank Stephen Siciliano and Gladys Lee for their assistance
in the production of this Article.
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